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Abstract ANSI RBAC is a standard for a consistent and uniform definition on Role Based Access Control
features and their functional specificationsANSI (2004) [1].We analyze both static anddynamic separation
of duty constraints specifications in the ANSI RBAC standard and evaluate their reliabilities. We then
suggest necessary improvements for making them completely reliable.
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Information is an asset for every organization, and its
security is a critical concern. In today’s computerized society,
protection of information and its security is an important
issue. The main objectives of security concentrate upon
protecting information from unauthorized disclosure and
preventing unauthorized actions and improper modification
of information. To protect information against different types
of threat, it is common to implement four kinds of control
measure: Flow control (which specifies the channel along
which information is allowed to move), encryption, access
control and inference control. The interested reader is referred
to [2], for details on flow control and encryption, and inference
control is a subject in the statistical database [3]. Our concern
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.in this paper is access control. Constraints are an important
aspect of access control and a powerful mechanism for laying
out a higher level organizational policy. The Separation of Duty
(SoD) constraint is a major class of role-based authorization
constraints.
Separation of Duty (SoD) is considered to be a fundamental
principle in security systems, both automated and manual
[4–7]. Although there are many variations, SoD is basically a
requirementwhere critical operations are divided between two
or more people, so that no single individual can compromise
security. This well known principle states that no single
individual should be capable of executing all parts of a sensitive
task [5–8]. A well known example is preparing, approving and
issuing a check. Generally, the same individual is not permitted
to do all three parts of this job by himself. This principle is one
of the main features of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). A
comprehensive survey in [9] found two broad categories of SoD
method: static and dynamic. Static SoD (SSoD) puts restrictions
on the assignment stage, while Dynamic SoD (DSoD) puts
restrictions on activation time and limits the availability of the
privileges to a user within or across working sessions.
The modern concept of RBAC, besides the notion of role
and role hierarchies, embodies the constraints on user-to-role
assignment and role set activation for enforcing separation of
duty concepts [10,11].
Since several RBAC models had been suggested, a general
agreement as to what constitutes an appropriate set of RBAC
features was necessary. A process to develop a standard for
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and Technology (NIST). A first effort at defining a consensus
standard for RBACwas proposed at the 2000 ACMworkshop on
RBAC [12]. Published comments on this earlier document and
panel session discussions at the ACM workshop [13] resulted
in developing the reference model and functional specification
in a second version, released publicly [14]. The second version
was submitted to the International Committee for Information
Technology Standards (INCITS). After an open public review
and some substantive changes, a standard was approved on
February 3, 2004, as the American National Standard ANSI
INCITS 359-2004 [1]. Plans for improving the standard and
moving it to the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) are underway.
Since the ANSI RBAC standard represents one of the most
important events in RBAC history, researchers have analyzed
different aspects of this standard, addressed some design prob-
lems and suggested possible solutions [8,15]. Even though Li
et al. [8] have studied the notion of enforcing separation of duty
policies related to the mechanism of Statically Mutually Ex-
clusive Roles (SMER) and Dynamically Mutually Exclusive Role
(DMER) constraints in RBAC systems including the ANSI RBAC
standard, andhavediscussed fundamental computational prob-
lems with respect to verifications, validations and generations
of SMER constraints for enforcing SSoD policies, according to
our knowledge, no body has yet directly analyzed the autho-
rization constraints, particularly the reliability of the separation
of duties in this standard, which is sometimes argued to be one
of the main motivations behind RBAC [11,16].
A common example of authorization constraints is the
mutually exclusive (conflicting) organizational roles, such as
purchasing manager and account payable manager. Generally,
the same individual is not permitted to belong to both roles,
because this creates a possibility for committing fraud. This
is exactly the separation of duty principle [5,6,9]. A great
variety of SoD models have been suggested [17], only some of
which have been so far considered for RBAC. Beside mutual
exclusion among roles, to provide additional assurance on
the SoD principle, RBAC96 [18] has also suggested mutual
exclusion onpermissions and constraints onpermission-to-role
assignments. A constraints language has also been proposed
for supporting SoD in RBAC [19–21]. In the standard of
ANSI RBAC [1], Static SoD relations (SSD) have been defined
with respect to constraints on user-to-role assignments and
Dynamic SoD relations (DSD), with constraints on the roles that
can be activated within or across a user sessions.
In a large organization with many roles and much permis-
sion, the distribution of permission among roles is an awkward
and complicated task. It is possible for a single user to receive
the permission of two ormoremutually exclusive roles through
two or more other different roles that have not been specified
to bemutually exclusive. Finding all conflicting permission sets
and distribution of permissions among roles, in consideration
of the least privilege principle that states every user of the sys-
tem should operate using the least set of privileges necessary
to complete his duty [22], is somehow an error prone, inflexible
and difficult task. This is an important point in specifying SoD
constraints, both static and dynamic, which has not received
enough attention in the literature. This paper discusses and an-
alyzes both static and dynamic separation of duties in the ANSI
RBAC standard, finds its vulnerability, and suggests possible re-
quired modifications for gaining complete reliability.
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows.
We first provide a summary of the current ANSI RBAC standard.Then, we analyze the methods of SoD constraint specifications
in this standard, and state the problem. Finally, we suggest
possible modifications for its complete reliability and conclude
the paper.
2. Overview of the ANSI RBAC standard
This standard consists of two main parts [1]; the RBAC Ref-
erence Model and the RBAC Systems and Administrative Func-
tional Specification. The RBAC Reference Model defines the set
of basic RBAC elements (i.e. users, roles, permissions, opera-
tions and objects), relations and functions that are included in
this standard. The RBAC System and Administrative Functional
Specification specify the features that are required for an RBAC
system. These features fall into three categories: The adminis-
trative operations,which provide the capability to create, delete
and maintain RBAC elements and relations, the administrative
reviews that provide the capability to performquery operations
on RBAC elements and relations, and finally the system level
functionality that defines features for the creation of user ses-
sions to include role activation/deactivation, the enforcement of
constraints on role activation and calculation of an access deci-
sion.
As stated in [1], the notation used in the formal specification
of the RBAC functions in this standard is a subset of Z
notations. However, there are some inconsistencies in their
formal specifications and some divergences from the standard
of Z notation [23]. Since we believe writing a new standard
should not violate other existing standards, we rewrite the
specification of the functions discussed here in the standard Z
notation, accurately, and type check themwith the Z/EVES [24].
This RBAC standardmodel defines a family of four functional
components, which include Core RBAC, Hierarchical RBAC,
Static SoD relations (SSD) and Dynamic SoD relations (DSD). The
motivation behind SSD andDSD is adding constraints, especially
the separation of duty constraints to this standard, to ensure
that fraud and major errors cannot occur without deliberate
collusion of multiple users.
Each functional component includes three sections: admin-
istrative operations, administrative review functions and sys-
tem level functions. The basic concept is that each component
can optionally be selected for inclusion into a package with one
exception that Core RBACmust be included as a part of all pack-
ages (Figure 1). The Core RBAC has the following specification:
Core RBAC: The basic concept of RBAC is that permissions are
assigned to roles and users obtain their permissions through
roles assigned to them. Core RBAC provides this basic concept
as shown in Figure 2. The basic elements of Core RBAC verbatim
from [1] are as follows:
• USERS, ROLES, OPS and OBS (users, roles, operations and
objects, respectively).
• UA ⊆ USERS × ROLES, a many-to-many mapping user-to-
role assignment relation.
• assigned_users: (r : ROLES) → 2USERS , the mapping of role
r onto a set of users. Formally: assigned_users (r) = {u ∈
USERS|(u, r) ∈ UA}.
• PRMS = 2(OPS×OBS), the set of permissions.
• PA ⊆ PRMS×ROLES, a many-to-manymapping permission-
to-role assignment relation.
• assigned_permissions (r : ROLES) → 2PRMS , the mapping
of role r onto a set of permissions. Formally: assigned_
permissions (r) = {p ∈ PRMS|(p, r) ∈ PA}.
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Figure 2: Core RBAC [1].
• Op(p : PRMS) → {op ⊆ OPS}, the permission to operation
mapping, which gives the set of operations associated with
permission p.
• Ob(p : PRMS) → {ob ⊆ OBS}, the permission to object
mapping, which gives the set of objects associated with per-
mission p.
• SESSIONS = the set of sessions.
• session_users (s : SESSIONS) → USERS, the mapping of ses-
sion s onto the corresponding user.
• session_roles (s : SESSIONS) → 2ROLES , the mapping of ses-
sion s onto a set of roles. Formally:
session_roles(si) ⊆ {r ∈ ROLES|(session_users(si), r) ∈ UA}.
• avail_session_perms (s : SESSIONS) → 2PRMS , the permis-
sions available to a user in a session = r∈session_roles(s)
assigned_permissions(r).
For Administrative Functions, Supporting System Functions and
Review Functions of Core RBAC, the reader is directed to the
standard [1].
2.1. Separation of duty in ANSI RBAC
In this standard, the constrained RBAC adds separation
of duty relations to the RBAC model. Separation of duty
relations are used to enforce conflict of interest policies that
organizations may employ to prevent users from exceeding a
reasonable level of authority according to their positions. The
motivation is to ensure that fraud and major errors cannot
occur without deliberate collusion of multiple users. Conflict
of interest in a role-based system may arise as a result ofFigure 3: SSDwithin Hierarchical RBAC [1].
a user gaining authorization for permissions associated with
conflicting roles. This standard allows for both static and
dynamic separation of duty.
2.1.1. Static separation of duty relations
One means of preventing conflict of interest is through
static separation of duty, which is to enforce constraint on the
assignment of users to roles. A common example is mutually
disjoint user assignments with respect to sets of conflicting
roles. For example, consider the purchasing department and the
processing of invoices. Let us assume that there are four types
of transaction involved in processing an invoice: create an order
(Data entry clerk), approve it (Supervisor), verify its receipt
(Purchasing officer) and authorize its payment (Department’s
Manager). The policymay require that a single individual not be
assigned to three or more of these roles. The static constraints
defined in this model are limited to those relations that place
restrictions on sets of roles and, in particular, on their ability to
form a UA relation. This model has defined SSD relations with
respect to constraints on the user-to-role assignment. It uses
a collection of pairs (rs, n), where rs is a role set that includes
two or more roles and n ≥ 2 is the associated cardinality,
which indicates the minimum number of combined roles from
the role set rs, the simultaneous assignment of which to a single
user would constitute a violation of the static SoD policy. The
following definition is taken verbatim from the standard.
Definition 1. SSD ⊆ (2ROLES × N) is collection of pairs (rs, n)
in Static Separation of Duty, where each rs is a role set, and
n is a natural number ≥2, with the property that no user is
assigned to n or more roles from the set rs in each (rs, n) ∈ SSD
simultaneously. Formally:
∀(rs, n) ∈ SSD, ∀t ⊆ rs : |t| ≥ n
⇒

r∈t
assigned_users(r) = φ. (1)
As illustrated in Figure 3, SSD relations may exist within
hierarchical RBAC, where inheritance relations exist among
roles. Role r1 inherits role r2 if all privileges of r2 are also
privileges of r1 or role r1 contains role r2 i.e. all users authorized
for r1 are also authorized for r2. To address this, SSD is defined
as a constraint on the authorized users of the roles rather than
the assigned users, so in the presence of a hierarchy, the former
definition becomes:
∀ (rs, n) ∈ SSD, ∀ t ⊆ rs : |t| ≥ n
⇒

r∈t
authorized_users(r) = φ.
We formalized the formal specification of the abstract state
as used in the approved standard, in the form of standard Z
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in the original specification explicitly. We add this specification
to be explicit about the state variables. This is the source
of inconsistency we found in the original specifications. The
authors of the original specifications assumed that there are
three state variables, namely, SSD, ssd_set, and ssd_card, which
is inconsistent with the specification of the SSD set.):
SSD State
SSD : P ROLES 9 N
∀ rs : P ROLES; n : N|(rs, n) ∈ SSD • ∀ t : P rs
•#t ≥ n ⇒(assigned_useres(|t|) = φ
The administrative functions for SSD relations are summarized
below:
• CreateSsdSet: Create an instance of a SSD relation.
• DeleteSsdSet: Deletes an existing SSD relation.
• AddSsdRoleMember: Adds a role to a SSD role set.
• DeleteSsdRoleMember: Deletes a role from a SSD role set.
• SetSsdCardinality: Sets the cardinality of the subset of roles
from a SSD role set for which common user membership
restriction applies.
2.1.2. Dynamic separations of duty relations
Dynamic SoD (DSoD) puts restrictions on the activation
time and limits the availability of the roles which have been
assigned to a user, within or across working sessions. DSoD
allows a user to be authorized for two or more roles that do not
create a conflict of interestwhen acted upon independently, but
produce policy concerns when activated simultaneously. For
example, a user may be authorized for both roles of Cashier and
Cashier Supervisor, but is not permitted to activate both roles
simultaneously. This standard has defined DSD relations, with
respect to constraints on the roles that can be activated within
or across a user session simultaneously. DSD is a collection of
pairs (rs, n), where rs is a role set that contains two or more
roles and n ≥ 2 is its associated cardinality with the property
that no subject may activate n or more roles from the role set rs
simultaneously. The following definition is taken verbatim from
the standard.
Definition 2. DSD ⊆ (2ROLES × N) is a collection of pairs (rs, n)
in Dynamic Separation of Duty, where each rs is a role set, and n
is a natural number ≥2, with the property that no subject may
simultaneously activate n or more roles from the set rs in each
(rs, n) ∈ DSD. Formally:
∀rs ∈ 2ROLES, n ∈ N, (rs, n) ∈ DSD ⇒ n ≥ 2. |rs| ≥ n,
and ∀s ∈ SESSIONS,∀rs ∈ 2ROLES,∀role_subset ∈ 2ROLES,∀n ∈
N, (rs, n) ∈ DSD, role_subset ⊆ rs, role_subset ⊆ session_
roles(s)⇒ |role_subset| < n.
The above formal specification, which is taken verbatim
from the standard, does not have any clear meaning and is
not consistent with Definition 2. We change it to the following
formalization, which exactly stands for Definition 2:
∀rs ∈ 2ROLES, n ∈ N, (rs, n) ∈ DSD ⇒ n ≥ 2 ∧ |rs| ≥ n,
and:
∀rs ∈ 2ROLES, n ∈ N, (rs, n) ∈ DSD,∀s ∈ SESSIONS
⇒ |session_roles(s) ∩ rs| < n. (2)According to the above specification, we formalize the formal
specification for the abstract state of the DSD relation in the
form of the standard Z notation as below:
DSD State
DSD : P ROLES 9 N
∀ rs : P ROLES; n : N|(rs, n) ∈ DSD ∧ n ≥ 2
∧#rs ≥ n • ∀s : SESSIONS•
#(session_roles(s) ∩ rs) < n
The administrative functions for DSD relations are summarized
below:
• CreateDsdSet: Creates an instance of a DSD relation.
• DeleteDsdSet: Deletes an existing DSD relation.
• AddDsdRoleMember: Adds a role to a DSD role set.
• DeleteDsdRoleMember: Deletes a role from a named DSD role
set.
• SetDsdCardinality: Sets the cardinality of the subset of
roles from named DSD role set, for which common user
membership restrictions apply.
3. Analysis of SoD specifications in ANSI RBAC standard
3.1. Analysis of static SoD specification
Since the ANSI RBAC standard enforces Static SoD through
SSD relations, with respect to constraints on the user-to-
role assignment, as defined in Section 2 (Definition 1), to
analyze Static SoD, we focus on the administrative operation
for creation of a new SSD element in the SSD collection; more
precisely, the function:CreateSsdSet. The commandCreateSsdSet
(role_set, n) creates a pair in the SSD collection with role_set as
a set of conflicting roles and sets the cardinality of its subsets
that cannot have common users to n. The command is valid if,
and only if:
• The SSD role set is not already in use.
• n is a natural number greater than, or equal to, two and less
than, or equal to, the cardinality of the role_set.
• The SSD constraint for the new role set is satisfied at this
moment.
The following formal specification for this function is taken
verbatim from the standard:
CreateSsdSet (set_name : NAME;
role_set : 2ROLES; n : N) ▹
set_name ∉ SSD;
(n ≥ 2) ∧ (n ≤ |role_set|);
role_set ⊆ ROLES,
r∈subset
subset⊆role_set
|subset|=n
assigned_users(r) = φ,
SSD′ = SSD

{set_name},
ssd_set ′ = ssd_set

{set_name → role_set},
ssd_card′ = ssd_card

{set_name → n} ◃ .
With a slight change, we can make it consistent with the
standards of the Z notations, as formalized in the following:
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∆ SSD State
role_set? : P ROLES
n? : N
(role_set?, n?) /∈ SSD
n? ≥ 2
n? ≤ #role_set?
∀subset : P role_set?|#subset = n?
•(assigned_users(|subset|)) = φ
SSD′ = SSD ∪ {role_set? → n?}
With consideration of the above command and its formal
specification, we are now in a position to analyze the Static SoD
specification method in the ANSI RBAC standard and track its
behavior. To recognize the problem with this method of static
SoD specification, we consider an example.
Example 1. Suppose there are two roles, r1 and r2, which are
staticallymutually exclusive. Role r1 has permission set {p1, p2},
while role r2 has permission set {p3}. In addition, there are
two other roles r3 with permission set {p1, p4} and role r4
with permission set {p2, p5}. It is possible for a user, u, who
is authorized to role r2 to become authorized to both roles r3
and r4 and as an effect gains the same permission set as roles r1
and r2 taken together plus some more permissions, as formally
shown below. (Remember that roles r2, r3 and r4 have not been
defined as being in conflict with each other.)
Some of the basic elements of the RBAC system that are used
in our analysis are:
• USERS = set of users e.g. {u1, u2, u3, . . .}.• PRMS = set of permissions e.g. {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, . . .}.• ROLES = set of roles e.g. {r1, r2, r3, r4, . . .}.• UA:USERS ↔ ROLES, amany-to-manymapping user-to-role
assignment relation.
• PA: PRMS ↔ ROLES, a many to many permission-to-role
assignment relation.
• SSD = Collection of SSD = {cr1, cr2, cr3 · · ·}, where each cri
is a pair (rsi, ni), with the property that no user is assigned
to ni or more roles from the role set rsi simultaneously.
The state of this example is as follows:
pr1 = assigned_permissions (r1) = {p1, p2}, (3)
pr2 = assigned_permissions (r2) = {p3}, (4)
pr3 = assigned_permissions (r3) = {p1, p4}, (5)
pr4 = assigned_permissions (r4) = {p2, p5}, (6)
SSD = {({r1, r2}, 2), . . .}. (7)
According to the specification of the function CreateSsdSet in
the ANSI RBAC standard, the following condition, which is also
concluded from the condition of Relation (1) in Definition 1, has
to be satisfied:
∀subset : P{r1, r2}|#subset ≥ 2
⇒

assigned_users(|subset|) = φ. (8)
Suppose we have not assigned any user to the roles r1 and r2
yet, and as a result the condition of Relation (8) is satisfied at
this moment, so we can add the pair ({r1, r2}, 2) to the SSD
collection. As a result, we have:
SSD′ = SSD ∪ {{r1, r2} → 2}.A user such as u1 can be assigned to roles r2, r3 and r4, since
according to the SSD collection, they are not in conflict with
each other. The condition of Relation (8) is still satisfied and
the constraint of Relation (1) is still holding, according to the
SSD collection. The available permission set for u1 through this
assignment is as follows:
Pu1 = UserPermissions (u1)
= assigned_permissions (r2)
∪ assigned_permissions (r3)
∪ assigned_permissions (r4)
= {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5}. (9)
Since the union of the sets of permissions of the two exclusive
roles, r1 and r2, is:
Pr1,r2 = pr1 ∪ pr2 = {p1, p2, p3}, (10)
we conclude that:
Pr1,r2 ⊂ Pu1 . (11)
As a result, through the non exclusive roles, r2, r3 and r4, the
user, u1, gains the set of permissions of the two exclusive roles,
r1 and r2, in his available permission set, without violating the
constraints on the user-to-role assignment with respect to SSD
relations. However, the organizational static SoD policy has
been violated. From this, we conclude that this method of static
SoD specification is not reliable. In the next section, we offer
suggestions for making the static SoD specification in the ANSI
RBAC standard completely reliable.
3.1.1. Suggestion for a reliable static SoD specification
The condition that is required to guarantee the reliability
of the static SoD principle in the ANSI RBAC standard is: It
should be impossible for a user to gain all permissions of
any statically exclusive role set, say role_set, through any non
exclusive role sets. So there should be a constraint that the
set of permissions a given user gets through his assigned
roles (A function is needed for mapping a user u to a set of
roles, which we call it user_assigned_roles and formally define
as: user_assigned_roles(u) = {r ∈ ROLES|(u, r) ∈ UA}.
This standard lacks such function.) should not be equal to,
or superset, the union of permissions of any n-subsets of the
role_set for any pair (role_set, n) in the SSD collection. Formally:
∀(role_set, n) ∈ SSD • |∀subncr : P role_set|
#subncr = n • ∀u : USERS ⇒
assigned_permissions (|subncr|)
⊈ UserPermissions (u). (12)
And since:
UserPermissions(u)
=

assigned_permissions (|user_assigned_roles(u)|),
we conclude that for a reliable static SoD, we should have the
condition:
∀(role_set, n) ∈ SSD • ∀subncr : Prole_set|
#subncr = n • ∀u : USERS ⇒
assigned_permissions (|subncr|) ⊈
assigned_permissions (|assigned_roles (u)|). (13)
For this condition to be satisfied, we have two choices:
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user-to-role assignment, i.e. constraint on UA relation. ANSI
RBAC has chosen this method by introducing the collection
SSD and the constraint of Relation (1) in Definition 1.
However, the point is that, as shown in Example 1, the
method of creating the elements of SSD does not prevent a
user from gaining the permissions of an exclusive role set
through some non exclusive role sets that are not members
of SSD. As a result, thismethod is not reliable. So if this choice
is to be considered, the method of creating the elements of
SSD has to be improved to a reliable method.
• Choice 2: A combination of role centric and permission
centric methods, which is to have constraint on both UA
and PA relations. In this case, beside SSD, we should also
introduce a collection for conflicting permission sets to put
restrictions on PA relations. A limited form of this option has
been suggested earlier in [18,19]. We have suggestion for
both above options as explained in the following:
Suggestion for Choice 1: Considering the first option, we
focus on a method of creating SSD elements, by the function
CreateSsdSet. What we need to do is to improve the
specification of this function, such that the condition of
Relation (13) is satisfied in all cases. For this purpose,
whenever we want to add a pair (role_set, n) to the SSD
collection, any other role sets that make the union of
permissions of any n-subset of the role_set available, should
also be introduce to SSD as a member, if they have not been
introduced to SSD before. If we do this, then there is no way
for a user to gain all permissions of an exclusive role set
through any other role set, because all those role sets have
been identified and introduced to SSD, and the constraint on
the UA relation prevents a user from being assigned to those
role sets.
To do this, besides adding the pair (role_set, n) to SSD, we
need to identify all other (role set, cardinality) pairs, say ssd,
which enables a user to gain all permissions of any n-subset of
the role_set. Any one of these identified ssdwhich is not already
included in SSD, and whose role set is not a superset of the
role_set, should also be added to the SSD collection.
The suggested specification for CreateSsdSet is as follows:
CreateSsdSet
∆SSD State
role_set? : P ROLES
n? : N
ssd : P ROLES 8 N
(role_set?, n?) /∈ SSD
n? ≥ 2 ∧ (n? ≤ #role_set?)
∀subset : P role_set?; rs : P ROLES; nrs : N|
#subset = n? ∧ nrs = #rs ∧ (rs, nrs) /∈ SSD∧
(role_set? * rs)•
•(assigned_users(|subset|)) = φ∧
(rs, nrs) ∈ ssd ⇔ assigned_permissions(|subset|)
⊆ assigned_permissions(|rs|)
SSD′ = SSD ∪ {role_set? → n?} ssd
In the above specification, we first make sure that the pair
(role_set, n) is not already a member of the SSD collection and
also that the static SoD constraint is holding at thismoment.We
then add this pair plus any other ssd pairs with an equivalent
permission set to the SSD collection.The above specification shows what is needed, and does not
suggest any algorithm for its implementation. To show that it is
possible to have an algorithm for the implementation of such a
specification, the following algorithm is proposed. It is obvious
that this is only a sample algorithm for showing what we mean
by the above specification, and it is not necessarily the optimum
one. The sample algorithm is as follows:
CreateSsdSet (role_set, n)
• If the constraint is already satisfied and (role_set, n) ∉ SSD,
add it to SSD.
• For each n-subset of the role_set, say subset i, do the
following:
– find pri, the union of the sets of permissions of the roles in
subset i, i.e. pri = ∪RolePermissions(|subset i|), and then for
each of the resulting permission sets, pri, do the following.
– For each permission in pri, find the set of roles to which
permission has been granted, i.e. PermissionRoles (|pri|).
– Find the Cartesian product of the resulting role sets,
i.e.

PermissionRoles(|pri|), to find all combinations of
roles whichmake all permissions of each of those permis-
sion sets available. We use

as the generalized Cartesian
product operation in the same way as generalized union
and generalized intersection operators.
– Consider each tuple in the resulting set from the Cartesian
product as a set, and any one of them which is not a
superset of the original exclusive role set, role_set, and
is not a member of SSD shall be added to SSD with its
cardinality.
With this method, it is guaranteed that the condition (13) is
satisfied at all time.
To find the set of roles which has been granted to a given
permission, we need a review function which returns the set of
roles that a given permission has been granted to, where the
specifications of this standard (Core RBAC, Section 2) lack such
a function. We call such a review function PermissionRoles, and
define it in Appendix A. Themethod is illustrated by a case study
in Appendix B.
Suggestion for Choice 2. For the second option, we shall define
a collection for statically conflicting permission sets; we call it
SCP and define it as follows:
Definition 3. SCP ⊆ (2PRMS × N) is a collection of pairs
(ps, n) in a static conflicting permission collection, where each
ps is a permission set and n is a natural number ≥2, with
the property that for each (ps, n) ∈ SCP , no single role is
granted n or more permissions from the set ps (A function
is needed for mapping a permission p on to a set of roles,
which we call it assigned_roles and is formally defined as:
assigned_roles(p) = {r ∈ ROLES|(p, r) ∈ PA}. This standard
lacks such function.), and the set of permissions a single user
gains through his/her assigned roles (The function named
UserPermissions in the standard returns this set.) does not
contain n or more permissions from set ps. Formally:
∀(ps, n) ∈ SCP,∀t ⊆ ps : |t| ≥ n
⇒

p∈t
assigned_roles(p) = φ,
and:
∀u : USERS ⇒
UserPermissions (u) ps < n. (14)
The formal specification of the abstract state of SCP in standard
Z notation is as follows:
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SCP : P PRMS 9 N
∀ps : P PRMS; n : N|(ps, n) ∈ SCP • ∀ t : P ps
•(#t ≥ n ⇒(assigned_roles(|t|)) = φ∧
∀ u : USERS • #((UserPermissions(u)) ∩ ps) < n
In this case, we need an administrative command for creating
SCP elements; we call this command CreateScpSet, and specify
it as follows:
CreateScpSet
∆ SCP State
per_set? : P PRMS
n? : N
(per_set?, n?) /∈ SCP
n? ≥ 2 ∧ n? ≤ #per_set?
∀subset : P per_set?|#subset = n?
•(assigned_roles(|subset|)) = φ
∀u ∈ USERS•
#(UserPermissions(u)

per_set?) < n?
SCP ′ = SCP{per_set? → n?}.
3.2. Analysis of dynamic SoD specification
Because this standard enforces dynamic SoD through DSD
relations,with respect to constraints on role activation by a user
in a working session, as defined in Section 2 (Definition 2) to
analyze dynamic SoD, we focus on the administrative operation
for creation of a new DSD element in the DSD collection, more
precisely the function CreateDsdSet. The command CreateDsdSet
(role_set, n) creates a pair in the DSD collection with role_set as
a set of conflicting roles, and sets the cardinality of its subsets
that cannot be activated simultaneously in a session, to the
numbern. The following specification for this command is taken
verbatim from the standard.
CreateDsdSet(set_name : Name; role_set : 2ROLES; n : N) ▹
set_name ∉ DSD; (n ≥ 2) ∧ (n ≤ |role_set|); role_set ⊆
ROLES ∀s : SESSIONS; role_subset : 2role_set • role_subset ⊆
session_roles(s)⇒|role_subset| < n,DSD′=DSD{set_name},
dsd_set ′ = dsd_set{set_name → role_set}, dsd_card′ =
dsd_card{set_name → n} ◃
According to our improved formal definition for the constraint
of Definition 2, Line 3 of the above specification is to be changed
to the improved formula of Relation (2). The Z notation of this
specification with the improved constraint is as follows:
CreateDsdSet
∆DSD State
role_set? : P ROLES
n? : N
(role_set?, n?) /∈ DSD
n? ≥ 2
n? ≤ #role_set?
∀ s : SESSIONS • #(session_roles(s)
role_set?) < n?
DSD′ = DSD{role_set? → n?}
By consideration of the above specification, we are ready to
analyze the Dynamic SoD specification method in the standard,and track its behavior. To recognize the problem, we again
consider the situation of Example 1, but this time, roles r1
and r2 are dynamically in conflict and cannot be activated
simultaneously in a single session. Roles r2, r3 and r4 that have
not beendefined to be in conflict can be activated in one session,
and the result is the same as activating roles r1 and r2. This is
the violation of dynamic SoD. This scenario indicates that the
method of dynamic SoD specification in this standard is not
reliable. Our suggestion for making dynamic SoD specifications
in the ANSI RBAC standard completely reliable is as follows.
3.2.1. Suggestion for a reliable dynamic SoD specification
The condition required to guarantee a reliable dynamic SoD
in the ANSI RBAC standard is similar to static SoD; the only
difference being that the constraint is on the role activation
phase rather than the assignment phase. This means that for
any (role_set, n) ∈ DSD, it should be impossible in a session
to activate the role set that makes the permission set of any
n-subset of the role_set available. The constraint for this
purpose is that in any session, the set of permissions a given
user gains through his active roles should not be equal to, or
superset of the permission set of any n-subsets of the role_set
for any pair (role_set, n) ∈ DSD. Formally:
∀(role_set, n) ∈ DSD • ∀ subncr :
P role_set|#subncr = n • ∀s : SESSIONS
⇒

assigned_permissions (|subncr|) ⊈
assigned_permissions (|session_roles(s)|). (15)
Our suggestion for satisfying the condition of Relation (15) is
to improve the specification of the function that creates the
DSD elements. The function, CreateDsdSet, does this job, so its
specification should be improved. For this purpose, whenever a
(role_set, n) pair is to be added to DSD, any other role set pair
that makes the union of the permissions of any n-subset of the
role_set available is also to be identified, and if not a member of
DSD, should be added to it. This is partly similar to what we did
in the role centric choice of static SoD (Choice 1). The suggested
specification for CreateDsdSet is as follows:
CreateDsdSet
∆DSD State
role_set? : P ROLES
n? : N
dsd : P ROLES 9 N
(role_set?, n?) /∈ DSD
n? ≥ 2
n? ≤ #role_set?
∀ s : SESSIONS
•#(session_roles(s) role_set?) < n?
∀subset : P role_set?|#subset = n?•
∀ rs : P ROLES; nrs : N|nrs = #rs∧
(rs, nrs) /∈ DSD ∧ role_set? * rs
•(rs, nrs) ∈ dsd ⇔ assigned_permissions
(|subset|) ⊆ assigned_permissions(|rs|)
DSD′ = DSD{role_set? → n?} dsd
An algorithm and a case study similar to those presented for the
static SoD are suitable for this suggestion.
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RBAC represents an important milestone in research and
development for access control models and techniques. So,
the fact that an initial standardization for RBAC has been
developed is important. However, due to the complexity of
RBAC, some aspects of the standard require further analysis and
modification.
The motivation for this research is the lack of any analysis
in the literature, with respect to the separation of duty
specifications in this standard, which is sometimes argued to
be the principle motivation behind RBAC [11,16]. In this paper,
we have analyzed both the static and dynamic separation of
duty constraints specifications of the approved ANSI RBAC
standard [1] and demonstrated its vulnerability. The main
contribution of this paper is in suggesting the required
modifications needed to make the methods of both static
and dynamic separation of duty constraint specifications in
the ANSI RBAC standard completely reliable. The interesting
problems that remain are finding efficient algorithms for their
enforcement and also modifications of the specifications of the
functions related to inducing changes to existing SSD,DSD and
SCP members for consistency. We hope that our analysis will
contribute to improvements in the RBAC standard.
Appendix A
Definition of PermissionRoles
PermissionRoles returns the set of roles that a given
permission p: (operation,object) has been granted to. The
function is valid only if the pair (operation,object) represents
a permission. The following schema formally describe this
function:
PermissionRoles : PRMS → P ROLES
∀ p : PRMS • PermissionRoles(p) =
{r : ROLES|(p, r) ∈ PA}
Appendix B
Case study
Example. Consider the same situation as Example 1 in
Section 3.1, i.e. roles: r1, r2, r3 and r4 with the required
permissions assigned to them, as shown in Relations (1)–(4).
Suppose that the organizational policy needs to introduce roles
r1 and r2 as exclusive, so a pair ({r1, r2}, 2) as (role_set, n) should
be added to the collection of conflicting role set SSD through the
function CreateSsdSet.
This pair indicates that roles r1 and r2 are in conflict with
each other and cannot be assigned to a single user at the same
time, andwewant to add this pair to the SSD collection.We shall
do this operation in such a way that makes it impossible for a
user to collect the permissions of these exclusive roles through
any other non exclusive role sets as occurred in Example 1.
We follow the specification of the improved CreateSsdSet, as
illustrated by the algorithm called CreateSsdSet.
1. If the constraint is already satisfied and this pair is not an
element of SSD at this time, add the pair (role_set, n) to SSD
collection. In this example, the pair is: ({r1, r2}, 2).
2. Find role_set_n, the set of all n-subsets of role_set. Here, n =
2 and as a result there is only one subset with this property,
so: role_set_n = {{r1, r2}}.3. For each element of the set role_set_n, do Steps a through f.
a. Find pri, the union of permissions of all the roles in that
element; in this example it will be formally as follows:
pr1 =

RolePermissions(|{r1, r2}|)
=

{{p1, p2}, {p3}} = {p1, p2, p3}. (B.1)
b. For each permission pj in the set pri, find rprj; the set
of all roles which have that permission in their assigned
permission set:
rpr1 = PermissionRoles(p1) = {r1, r2}, (B.2)
rpr2 = PermissionRoles(p2) = {r1, r4}, (B.3)
rpr3 = PermissionRoles(p3) = {r2}. (B.4)
c. Compute, cp, the Cartesian product of all the above rprj
role sets. Here, they are rpr1, rpr2 and rpr3, so we have:
cp =

{rpr1, rpr2, rpr3}
= rpr1 × rpr2 × rpr3
= {⟨r1, r1, r2⟩, ⟨r1, r4, r2⟩,
⟨r3, r1, r2⟩, ⟨r3, r4, r2⟩}. (B.5)
d. Regard each tuple of the Cartesian product cp as a role set.
The result will be as follows:
cp = {{r1, r2}, {r1, r4, r2}, {r3, r1, r2}, {r3, r4, r2}}. (B.6)
e. For each element ti of cp in Relation (B.6), if the original
role_set ⊈ ti and the pair (ti,#ti) ∉ SSD, add that pair to
the SSD collection beside the original pair. In this example,
it is as follows:
{r1, r2} ⊆ {r1, r2}, (B.7)
{r1, r2} ⊆ {r1, r4, r2}, (B.8)
{r1, r2} ⊆ {r3, r1, r2}, (B.9)
{r1, r2} ⊈ {r3, r4, r2}. (B.10)
So:
SSD′ = SSD ∪ {({r1, r2}, 2)} ∪ {({r3, r4, r2}, 3)}. (B.11)
f. Repeat Steps a through f for all the elements of role_set_n.
Notice that in this example, according to Relations (B.7)
through (B.10), only the set {r3, r4, r2} remains. The cardinal-
ity of this set is three, so beside the original pair ({r1, r2}, 2),
the pair ({r3, r4, r2}, 3) is also added as an exclusive role set
pair to the SSD collection.
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